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Denmark
Closed doors
SUPREME COURT ORDER
delivered on Thursday 10 May 2012
Case 129/2011
Prosecution
against
T
(Advocate Lars Lindhard, appointed)
In previous instances, the district court in Esbjerg and 
the High Court of Western Denmark Second Department 
handed down rulings on 20 October 2010 and 8 February 
2011 respectively. On 15 April 2011, leave to appeal was 
granted by the Appeals Permission Board, allowing the 
High Court’s ruling to be brought before the Supreme 
Court.
Five judges participated in the adjudication: Peter Blok, 
Poul Søgaard, Marianne Højgaard Pedersen, Thomas 
Rørdam and Jens Peter Christensen.
Allegations
T has reiterated his claim before the High Court that the 
police are not authorised to carry out data acquisition of 
T’s Facebook profile (X @ X) and Messenger profile (Y @ 
Y), and that the police’s data reading on 19 October 2010 
of T’s profile on Facebook should not be approved.
The prosecution has argued that the High Court ruling 
be upheld, however, provided that the interventions are 
approved in accordance with the Administration of Justice 
Act’s rules on repeated secret searches; in the alternative, 
as determined by the High Court in accordance with the 
Administration of Justice Act’s rules on data reading.
Pleas
Concerning the Administration of Justice Act § 791 b 
relating to the reading of data, T has submitted that the 
rule cannot be applied because his Facebook profile and 
Messenger profile cannot be considered to be information 
systems, i.e. a computer or other data processing system.
The conditions for search are not met, since there does 
not exist anything that can be searched, because the 
information resides on a server. The conditions for the 
interception of communications are also not met.
Although the crime under investigation is subject to 
Danish criminal jurisdiction, a clear legal basis and a 
license from the country’s authorities are required for the 
police to undertake action outside its borders. Neither the 
statutory authority nor the permission exists.
The fact that the police can actually gain access to these 
profiles from Denmark, does not mean that the profiles 
are necessarily subject to Danish jurisdiction when the 
holder of the profiles resides in another country and uses 
the profiles from there, and when the servers are located 
in other countries.
It is clear from the rules for Facebook, that Facebook 
is based in Santa Clara County, California, that all data 
are stored on a server in the United States, and that 
Californian law applies to the relationship between 
Facebook and the profile owner. The Messenger profile 
is domiciled in Luxembourg. The authorities in these 
countries should therefore have been involved. In 
addition, he has had to connect to these services via a 
Canadian telecommunications provider, when he stayed 
in Canada, so the Canadian authorities should have 
approved the police actions.
The rules on criminal procedural measures must 
necessarily be subject to a strict interpretation. Analogies 
and expanded interpretations cannot be considered.
The prosecution contends that the measure is similar 
in nature, or equivalent to repeated secret searches, and 
case translation: denmark
CASE CITATION:  
U 2012.2614 H
NAME AND LEVEL OF COURT:  
Højesteret (Supreme Court)
DATE OF DECISION:  
10 May 2012
MEMBERS OF THE COURT:  
Peter Blok, Poul Søgaard, Marianne 
Højgaard Pedersen, Thomas Rørdam and 
Jens Peter Christensen
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 10 (2013)        163© Pario Communications Limited, 2013
that the conditions laid down in accordance with the 
Administration of Justice Act § 799, see § 793 paragraph 
1, no. 1, for doing so are met. The police have, by using 
the correct username and password subsequent to the 
ruling of the District Court, repeatedly logged on T’s 
Facebook and Messenger profiles for the purpose of 
examination of the information and messages that were 
to be found during the respective investigation times, 
including messages received and sent (e-mails, chat, 
etc.). The information on T’s wall on Facebook, which for 
example can contain status updates, can most accurately 
be compared with a bulletin board found in a house by 
the police in connection with a search. The police have 
therefore obtained access to a ‘snapshot’ similar to that 
which the police can achieve by a physical search. The 
intervention did not include information in transit, and 
therefore the rules on the interception of communications 
are not applicable.
In support of it being a question of search, see Report 
no 1023/1984, page 55, and Report no 1377/1999 section 
6.1 and the preparatory work for Law no 465 of 7 June 
2001 on receiving stolen goods and other subsequent 
complicity and for IT investigations, see Bill no 194, the 
parliamentary year 2000-01, the general comments 
section 4.2. It is also supported by the preparatory work 
for Act no 378 of 6 June 2002, where, amongst other 
things, the rules on reading data were inserted.
In relation to the search rules, it is immaterial that the 
data in question was not stored on a computer belonging 
to T, but on servers affiliated with Facebook and 
Messenger, given that the information can be accessed by 
using the correct username and password and without the 
involvement of the provider of Facebook and Messenger 
or other third parties.
The intervention must be assumed to be of crucial 
importance to the investigation of the case, hence this 
condition is complied with, both as regards the search 
rules and data reading rules.
If assumed that the intervention is fully or partially 
covered by the Administration of Justice Act’s rules on 
the interception of communications, these conditions 
are also satisfied, see Administration of Justice Act § 781, 
paragraph 1.
According to the preparatory work for the 
Administration of Justice Act § 791 b, paragraph 1, it 
seems the rules on reading data are directed, in particular, 
at cases in which the police by installing sniffer programs 
or other items of equipment on a computer to be able to 
gain access to information residing in the computer in 
question. In the present situation, it is hardly a question 
of the reading of the data being done with the assistance 
of ‘programs or other equipment.’
The criminal procedural measure is carried out as 
part of a criminal investigation conducted by the Danish 
authorities with a view to possible prosecutions in 
Denmark. The investigation of the case, including the 
implementation of the criminal procedural measures, 
must therefore be carried out in accordance with the rules 
in the Administration of Justice Act. The court shall only 
consider whether the conditions for the interventions are 
fulfilled in accordance with rules in the Administration 
of Justice Act; not whether the implementation of the 
action in that case will require assistance from foreign 
authorities, or whether it could be implemented by Danish 
police on their own.
The legal basis
On the limitations of a search with respect to other 
coercive procedural measures, reference is made to the 
Bill’s general explanatory notes on report 1159/1989, see 
FT 1996/1997, appendix A, sp. 2488. In the explanatory 
notes the following is stated regarding the report:
‘It follows, amongst other things, that the concept of 
search also includes the examination of e.g. electronic 
media in the same manner as paper is likely to be 
a carrier of semantic content. It will thus constitute 
a search, if you read a floppy disk found during a 
search, or information that is stored in the memory 
on a computer. It is also deemed to be a search to 
play a message that was previously recorded on an 
answering machine.
Conversely, the interception of correspondence 
between the computer of the accused and a computer 
in another location or the interception of a telephone 
conversation is an intervention in the confidentiality of 
communications, which is regulated by the rules of the 
Administration of Justice Act Chapter 71.’
Reasoning of the Supreme Court and 
decision
The police may gain access to T’s Facebook and 
Messenger profiles from any computer with internet 
access using only the codes that the police became 
familiar with through telephone intercepts.
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The information that the police can learn from such 
interventions is – in the same way as e-mails that are sent 
and received – not information in transit. The information 
is stored in profiles and available using the codes.
The Supreme Court finds that the interventions have 
the characteristics of repeated secret searches that can be 
made on the basis of the Administration of Justice Act § 
793.1, subparagraph 1, pursuant to § 799.
Since the crime with which T is charged is subject 
to Danish criminal jurisdiction, as the matter is under 
investigation by the Danish authorities, and as the 
interventions can be made without involving foreign 
authorities, it cannot lead to a different result, that T from 
February 2010 to February 2011 was abroad, and that the 
information contained in the profiles reside on servers 
abroad.
Accordingly – and since the other conditions for 
approving the interventions in the Administration of 
Justice Act § 794 are found to be fulfilled – the Supreme 
Court upholds that the police are permitted to read T’s 
Facebook and Messenger profiles.
For the reasons stated by the district court, the 
Supreme Court also upholds that the police’s reading 
on 19 October 2010 is approved in accordance with the 
Administration of Justice Act § 796, paragraph 3.
It is held:
The police are allowed to take readings of T’s Facebook 
profile (X @ X) and Messenger profile (Y @ Y) as repeated 
secret searches, and the police’s reading on 19 October 
2010 of T’s Facebook profile is approved.
With thanks to Helena Lybæk Guðmundsdóttir for her 
help with this translation.
Helena Lybæk Guðmundsdóttir is a PhD student at the 
department of law at Aalborg University. Her main area of 
research is cybercrime law. Other interests include data 
privacy law and European Union law.
helena@law.aau.dk
Commentary
By Lars Bo Langsted
The fact that Supreme Court finds that Facebook and 
Messenger profiles are subject to the rules of search 
in the Administration of Justice Act is hardly surprising. 
Given that the preparatory work of the rules of search 
expressly mentions that reading the content of a 
computer or listening to messages left in an answering 
machine is a search, it would be more surprising had 
Supreme Court reached another conclusion regarding this 
question.
The really interesting item in this ruling is the question 
of jurisdiction. There are two sub-questions involved of 
which Supreme Court, however, only seem to address 
one. The first sub-question is the issue of criminal 
jurisdiction: whether the acts of the defendant come 
within Danish criminal jurisdiction. The answer is – 
undoubtedly – yes. The crime that was under investigation 
was a drug related crime and since the defence counsel 
does not doubt that there is criminal jurisdiction for 
the alleged crime, it is safe to assume that it has been 
committed on Danish territory or had the necessary 
connection to Denmark. The second sub-question is 
the hardest: whether Danish police are allowed to use 
investigative measures that involve foreign territory and 
thus foreign jurisdiction.
As a rule, the police are not allowed to investigate in 
territories other than that of Denmark. To a limited extent, 
some European Union legislation1 allows the police to 
continue a pursuit after a criminal when trying to escape 
arrest. Any other investigative measure, however, is to 
be taken by the foreign, local police authority if they are 
asked to assist. In the physical world this means that 
any kind of search – or seizure for that matter – can only 
be carried out by the local police. The Danish police are 
able to search computers and the like within Danish 
territory. If the Danish police suspect that a computer 
with compromising content is to be found in Germany 
or Russia, they have to ask the German or Russian 
authorities for their assistance to carry out the search.
In the case at hand, the ‘computer’, meaning the 
content of the Facebook and Messenger profiles, were 
undoubtedly physically located on a server in California, 
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1 Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing in 
accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on 
European Union the Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters between the 
Member States of the European Union, OJ 
197, 12.07.2000, pp 0001–0002; Protocol 
established by the Council in accordance 
with Article 34 of the Treaty on European 
Union to the Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters between 
the Member States of the European Union, 
OJ C 326, 21.11.2001, pp 2–8; European 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters and Protocols (Strasbourg, 
20.IV.1959); Additional Protocol to the 
European Convention on Mutual Assistance 
in Criminal Matters (Strasbourg, 17.III.1978); 
Second Additional Protocol to the European 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters (Strasbourg, 8.XI.2001).
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 10 (2013)        165© Pario Communications Limited, 2013
USA. Under normal circumstances this would mean that 
the Danish police should ask for the assistance from the 
American police authorities to carry out a search of the 
content. But in this case, the Danish police were able to 
carry out the search from their own office in Denmark 
since they were in possession of the necessary username 
and password and because the content of the computer 
in question was linked to the internet, which meant it was 
accessible from the entire world.
The Danish rules on criminal jurisdiction do not 
cover acts that have no direct connection to Denmark. 
In brief: attacks or intrusions carried out from abroad 
against computers on Danish territory are under Danish 
jurisdiction. This is the same for content on web pages 
that are directed at Danish relations or to Danish 
consumers. Any other content stored in computers 
(physically placed outside Danish territory) or of web 
pages – regardless of whether they are accessible from 
Denmark – fall without Danish jurisdiction (unless of 
course the content was written in the Danish territory).
Returning to the question of investigative jurisdiction, 
the rules on criminal jurisdiction would lead to the 
assumption that if – and only if – the content of a 
computerized system was accessible from Denmark 
and had some linkage to Denmark in way of content or 
language or was created in Danish territory, it would 
be admissible for the Danish police to carry out the 
necessary investigation under Danish legislation and 
without being bound to have admission from the local 
police authorities. The Supreme Court, however, seems 
to have taken a shortcut. The Court does not mention 
that the content of the profiles in question have a specific 
link to Denmark, other than the fact that the suspected 
‘original’ criminal acts were covered by Danish criminal 
jurisdiction and that the Danish police were undertaking 
the investigation. But this misses the point, since it 
would most likely be the case every time the Danish 
police conduct an investigation and that does not – as 
referred above – give Danish police any authority to take 
investigative measures on a foreign territory. It seems as 
if the Supreme Court has simply stated that the search 
was legal because it was possible.
Perhaps that is the message from Supreme Court. And 
maybe that is the rational way of rethinking investigative 
jurisdiction when it comes to the internet. The users of the 
internet do not know – and could not know – where the 
servers they are using, passing or visiting are situated. 
And the point is: they do not care. The physical positions 
of the servers are irrelevant to the users, and Supreme 
Court says: it is irrelevant to us and to the police. One 
might say that Danish Supreme Court with this ruling 
has accepted cyberspace as a place of its own, but at 
the same time part of the investigative jurisdiction of 
Denmark (and any other country?).
© Lars Bo Langsted, 2013
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